“Why the West isn’t winning, and what we must do about it.” Quite a lot of circumstantial assertion and straw-manning rather than really well-analysed evidence - overall, I didn’t love it. Felt like there might be a more serious book in here squelched by a desire to make it punchy. But some potentially useful ideas to pull out of it:

• Spending on high-tech weapons is generally too high and delivers minimal value. F-35, supercarriers as examples. (Fully agree here.) Maven as another example but poorly discussed.
• New technologies take longer to change practice than often claimed when first announced/analysed, e.g. Stuxnet didn’t actually cripple the Iranian nuclear program.
• High-tech militaries have repeatedly lost (in the sense of not achieving their political war aims) to low-tech ones: France in Indochina, Algeria; UK in Aden, Palestine, Cyprus; USSR in Afghanistan; Israel in Lebanon; US in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan.
• “Conventional” war is tied to the primacy of states, and state primacy is a historic anomaly. Before Westphalia, there was a chaotic period where mercenaries, sub-national groups, and non-state actors like the Church were engaged in struggle. In modern day, groups like private military contractors, drug cartels, insurgencies, etc are driving that trend. Strategy for engaging these actors as part of a war is important, but under-considered.
• Proposed changes to military spending:
  • Active duty vs reserve duty units should be inverted. Common active duty units like fighters, tanks, etc are rarely used, especially for their primary purpose. Support units like intelligence, logistics, etc are more frequently needed, including for non-combat operations. Inverting which units are constantly staffed vs only reserve staffed would improve outcomes and make a cultural shift.
  • Should have more support for civilian power projection such as information operations, “pinpoint sanctions”, public diplomacy, etc.
  • Should have more CIA-run, private-delivered (by ad agencies/Hollywood) information operations.
  • Should have more expansive strategic military education at earlier stages, rather than focusing on tactics that are more applicable to conventional war.
  • Should have more “white SOF”, i.e. SOF units that liaise with and train foreign militaries.
• Strategies to investigate: China ‘Three Warfares’, Russia ‘New Generation Warfare’, Israel ‘Campaign Between the Wars’